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Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3353 (Nov. 29, 1999) (No. 99-474).
Last fall's protests at the World Trade Organization (WTO) convention in
Seattle evidenced mounting pressure by states and municipalities to retain their
authority to further shared values of environmental conservation, labor stan-
dards, and human rights through their government procurement policies.' As
one local commentator lamented, "the WTO has had a tremendous chilling ef-
,,2fect on jurisdictions. For example the Seattle City Council declined to enact a
selective purchasing ordinance targeting human rights abuses in Burma after a
similar law in Massachusetts was challenged before the WTO.3 That law, the
Massachusetts Burma Law (MBL), 4 now faces constitutional challenge as well.
In Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council,5 the Supreme Court will decide
the MBL's fate under U.S. law,6 presumably the validity of at least 31 other
J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2002; M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Har-
vard University, 1999; A.B., Stanford University, 1994. The author thanks Professor Paul Kahn, John
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1. See, e.g., Donella H. Meadows, Editorial, Record Explains Protests in Seattle, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 29, 1999, at B7, (citing the challenge to the Massachusetts Burma Law under the WTO
as a reason environmentalists, human rights advocates, and labor organizations oppose the WTO); Rob-
ert G. Pedersen, Democratic Input Into World Trade, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 2, 1999, at A19, ("Citi-
zens should have the right to democratically determine how their tax dollars are spent, and pass pro-
curement provisions to promote environmental goals ... or social progress ...."); Top 10 reasons to
oppose the WTO, NAT'L POST, Oct. 29, 1999, at C7 (citing WTO obstacles to using trade policy to in-
fluence the Burmese dictatorship or to limit child labor as one of the top 10 reasons to oppose the
WTO).
2. Geov Parrish, WTO 101, SEATTLE WKLY., Nov. 11, 1999, at 25.
3. See id.
4. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (Lexis 1999). Burma changed its name to Myanmar in
1989. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir.) (1999). To maintain
consistency with the language of the district court, First Circuit and petitioner, this Case Note refers to
the federal sanctions as the "Federal Burma Law" and to the country Myanmar as "Burma."
5. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U. S.L.W. 3353 (Nov. 29, 1999) (No. 99-474),
6. Under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, § I 02(b)(2)(A), 108
Stat. 4809, 19 U.S.C.S §3512(b)(2)(A) (1994), "[nlo State law ... may be declared invalid ... on the
ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
except in an action brought by the United States for [that] purpose .. " Since the United States is not
the plaintiff in this case, the Court cannot consider whether the Massachusetts Burma Law violates the
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municipal selective purchasing laws targeting Burma and other countries7 and
the ex post legality of 117 such laws aimed at apartheid South Africa.8
The MBL prohibits the Commonwealth and its agents from purchasing
goods or services from any person doing business with Burma unless the
party's bid is ten percent lower than all others received. 9 Pursuant to this re-
striction, the statute authorizes the state to establish a "restricted purchase list"
of companies doing business with Burma, 1° which includes firms that have a
principal place of business or a majority-owned subsidiary in the country, or
engage in certain forms of business with the government of Burma.11 The MBL
governs only state government purchasing and does not affect the transactions
of private citizens. However, given that Massachusetts purchases more than $2
billion in goods and services annually,12 while the entire GDP of Burma is $19
billion,13 three companies, all members of the National Foreign Trade Council
(NFTC), withdrew from Burma in the following years in partial response.
14
NFTC filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute as a result.' 5 Simultane-
ously Congress had authorized sanctions proscribing new U.S. investment in
Burma, including that by private parties, just three months after passage of the
URAA, the instrument by which the United States joined the WTO.
7. See Marc Selinger, State Law Punishing Burma Probed, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at B8.
Current municipal purchasing laws also target Nigeria, Tibet, Indonesia, Cuba, Switzerland and "coun-
tries with sweatshop labor." Id.
8. Twenty-three states, 14 counties and 80 cities enacted divestment or procurement legislation
directed at South Africa's apartheid policies. See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in
Foreign Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 822 (1989).
9. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-22H. The MBL exempts companies that are only provid-
ing medical supplies to Burma, and transactions where the Commonwealth is purchasing certain medical
supplies, see id. at § 221, or the procurement is essential and the restriction would eliminate the only bid
or would result in inadequate competition, see id. at § 22H(b).
10. See id. at § 22J. Once that agency, the Operational Services Division, makes a preliminary
finding that a company does business with Myanmar, the company can submit a sworn affidavit to re-
fute the finding. OSD then makes a final decision whether to place a company on the "restricted pur-
chase list." See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999).
11. Specifically, the law defines "doing business with Burma" to include:
(a) having a principal place of business, place of incorporation or... corporate headquarters
in Burma (Myanmar) or having any operations, leases, franchises, majority-owned subsidiar-
ies, distribution agreements, or any other similar agreements in Burma (Myanmar), or being
the majority-owned subsidiary, licensee or franchise of such a person; (b) providing financial
services to the government of Burma (Myanmar), including providing direct loans, under-
writing government securities, providing any consulting advice or assistance, providing bro-
kerage services, acting as a trustee or escrow agent, or otherwise acting as an agent pursuant
to a contractual agreement; (c) promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas or
other related products, commerce in which is largely controlled by the government of Burma
(Myanmar), from Burma (Myanmar); (d) providing any goods or services to the government
of Burma (Myanmar).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22G.
12. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53.
13. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDES FY 1999: BURMA,
(visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/aboutstate/business/comguides/1999/eastasia/
burma99_01.html> (1997/98 estimate).
14. See Natsios, 181 F.3dat47.
15. See id. at 48.
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MBL.16 The Federal Burma Law instructs the President, upon determination of
specified human rights abuses, to prohibit new private and public investment in
Burma that involves "the economic development of resources located in
Burma" and excludes contracts for goods, services or technology. 17 In May
1997 President Clinton activated these federal sanctions, proscribing new in-
vestment by U.S. persons in Burmese "natural, agricultural, commercial, finan-
cial, industrial, [or] human resources."'
8
Upon stipulated facts, the United States District Court for Massachusetts
granted summary judgment for NFTC, holding that the MBL impermissibly
infringes on the federal government's power to regulate foreign affairs. 19 The
district court noted that the federal sanctions did not preempt the MBL, and de-
clined to address the law's validity under the Commerce Clause.20 The First
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding on the federal foreign affairs power
and found that that the statute violates the dormant foreign Commerce Clause
and was preempted by the Federal Burma Law.2' In the absence of Supreme
Court precedent on the subject, neither court determined whether the market
participant exception to the interstate Commerce Clause-which exempts
states from dormant Commerce Clause limitations when acting as market par-
ticipants rather than regulators 2-applies to the dormant foreign Commerce
Clause or foreign affairs power.
23
By extending the market participant exception to foreign commerce and
foreign affairs, the Court would ensure consistency in its Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence, articulate a clear standard for state authority as market partici-
pants given the increasing integration of domestic and foreign markets, and
create the widest range of congressional foreign policy options. This extension,
16. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat.
3009, 1, 166-67 (1996).
17. Id. at § 570(b). The law also bars any "United States assistance to the Government of Burma,"
except for humanitarian assistance, assistance for anti-narcotics or crop substitution efforts, or "assis-
tance promoting human rights and democratic values." Id. at § 570(a)(1). It mandates that the United
States oppose any "loan or other utilization of funds" by international financial institutions to or for
Burma, and denies visas to most Burmese officials seeking entry to the United States unless required by
treaty. See id. at § 570(a)(2-3). It also instructs the President to work with "members of ASEAN and
other countries having major trading and investment interests in Burma" to develop "a comprehensive,
multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights practices and the quality of life in
Burma ..... Id. at § 570(c). Finally, the law requires the President to report to Congress and grants her
the power to waive any of the sanctions if she "determines and certifies to Congress that the application
of such sanction would be contrary to the national security interests of the United States." Id. §§ 570(d),
(e).
18. Exec. Order No. 13,047 § 4(e), 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (1997).
19. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289-90 (D. Mass. 1998).
20. Seeid. at l7-18.
21. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at45.
22. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984).
23. The First Circuit suggested that the market participant exception should not encompass the for-
eign affairs or foreign commerce powers and held that the MBL does not qualify as market participation,
if such an exception exists. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 59-60, 62, 65-66.
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however, should be balanced with a stricter preemption standard for state and
local selective purchasing laws manifesting foreign policy concerns than the
"major damage" standard for traditional state functions like government pro-
curement. Under these clarifications of the market participant and preemption
doctrines, the MBL would stand.
I. TRADITIONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
ANALYSIS
Absent a market participant exception, the lower courts correctly held that
the MBL transgresses the foreign Commerce Clause and possibly the foreign
affairs power. The foreign Commerce Clause prohibits state laws that facially
24discriminate against foreign commerce, without a compelling justification.
For example, in Kraft General Foods v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Fi-
nance, the Court invalidated as facially discriminatory an Iowa tax scheme that
treated dividends from and taxes paid for foreign subsidiaries less favorably
than domestic subsidiaries. 25 Under domestic Commerce Clause analysis, the
lack of a local benefit or of widespread disadvantage to out-of-state competi-
tors does not exempt discrimination from Commerce Clause prohibitions.
26
Similarly, under foreign Commerce Clause analysis, the applicability of a state
law to both foreign and domestic companies does not save it if it targets a par-
27ticular state or nation. Furthermore, although the foreign Commerce Clause
does not invalidate state laws with only "foreign resonances, '28 state laws dis-
criminating against foreign commerce face more rigorous scrutiny than their
24. See Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) ("Absent a
compelling justification, however, a State may not advance its legitimate goals by means that facially
discriminate against foreign commerce.").
25. See id. at 74.
26. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (per curium) (1988) ("[W]here discrimina-
tion is patent... neither a widespread advantage to in-state interests nor a widespread disadvantage to
out-of-state competitors need be shown."); Kraft, 505 U.S. at 79 ("As the absence of local benefit does
not eliminate the international implications of the discrimination, it cannot exempt such discrimination
from Commerce Clause prohibitions"). But see Kraft, 505 U.S. at 83-84 ("Iowa obviously has no selfish
motive.., and the absence of such a motive is strong indication that none of the local advantage which
has so often characterized our Commerce Clause decisions is sought here.") (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Bd. of Trustees v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 754-55 (Md. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (upholding Baltimore's divestment of pension-fund investments from South Af-
rica under a domestic Commerce Clause analysis because it does not favor city residents in purpose or
effect, and because its burdens on interstate commerce do not outweigh the city's interest in moral con-
demnation of racial discrimination).
27. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317 (1851) (permitting a Pennsylvania
law requiring pilots, or a contribution to a pilots' fund, for vessels using state ports, while noting that the
Framers were anxious to prevent "discriminations favorable or adverse to commerce with particular for-
eign nations").
28. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 462 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (validating a California
method of taxing income of multinational corporations that differed from federal and foreign policies
and holding that "if a state tax merely has foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign affairs, we
cannot infer, absent some explicit directive from Congress,... that treatment of foreign income at the
federal level mandates identical treatment by the States") (citation omitted).
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domestic counterparts since the Framers intended the scope of the foreign
commerce power to be greater than the interstate commerce power.
29
The MBL discriminates against companies doing business with Burma. It
also discriminates against foreign commerce generally for, of necessity, only
firms engaging in foreign commerce do business with Burma. One may argue
the MBL presents only "foreign resonances." But when aggregated with other
state and local selective purchasing laws, its effect seems substantial.30 Moreo-
ver, to hold that the Court must engage in a case-by-case analysis of the foreign
resonance of state policies that openly aim to influence foreign nations31 would
create confusion where the bright line of intent exists and force courts to en-
gage in policy analysis outside their expertise. A much stronger argument for
the MBL is that states' interest in expressing shared values through their tradi-
tional procurement authority constitutes a compelling justification for dis-
crimination against some forms of foreign commerce. Yet this assertion is
more an argument for a market participant exception rather than a justification
for the MBL in its absence.32
Similarly the foreign affairs power-lacking a market participant excep-
tion-presents obstacles to the MBL. Zschernig v. Miller33 established an im-
29. See Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) ("[T]here is evidence
that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater [than the interstate
commerce power]"); see also id. at 446 ("When construing Congress's power to 'regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations,' a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required [than for interstate com-
merce]"); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) ("[S]tate restrictions
burdening foreign commerce are subjected to a more rigorous and searching scrutiny" than interstate
commerce).
30. See, e.g., Richard Haas, Sanctions Almost Never Work, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1998 ("Sanc-
tions.., probably hastened the end of South African apartheid."); Peter N. Bouckaert, The Negotiated
Revolution: South Africa's Transition to a Multiracial Democracy, 33 STAN. J INT'L L. 375, 380 (1997)
("[T]here is little doubt that the lifting of sanctions was a powerful carrot that lured the NP government
to the negotiating table.").
31. Massachusetts conceded that the MBL was enacted solely to sanction Myanmar for human
rights violations and to change Myanmar's domestic policies. See National Foreign Trade Council v.
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass.) (1998).
32. The First Circuit also proffered weaker arguments that the MBL transgresses the foreign Com-
merce Clause. First, it asserted that state commerce legislation may not impair the federal government's
ability to "speak with one voice" in foreign affairs, because such state action harms "federal uniformity
in an area where federal uniformity is essential." National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d
38, 68-69 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448-49). Second, it noted the holidng in BMW
of North America v. Gore that the principles of state sovereignty and comity proscribe states from "im-
posing economic sanctions on violators of its own laws with the intent of changing... lawful conduct in
other States" or, presumably, nations. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 69 (citing BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (invalidating a punitive damage award by Alabama courts because it was based on
the national number of non-disclosures, though non-disclosure was legal for legitimate policy reasons in
other states)); see also Healy v. Beer Inst. 491 U.S. 324, 336 (holding that the critical inquiry is whether
the practical effect of state regulation is to control conduct beyond its borders in nullifying a Connecti-
cut statute attempting to peg state liquor prices to those of other states). In fact, the MBL may merely
amplify the federal government's unitary voice. Further, unlike BMW, where the Alabama courts sanc-
tioned BMW for legal conduct in other states, the MBL aims to change unlawful, not lawful, conduct of
other nations. Ample evidence indicates that Burma continues to violate international law on numerous
counts. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
33. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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plied federal foreign affairs power in striking down an Oregon statute barring
non-resident aliens from inheriting state property if their home country did not
offer U.S. citizens reciprocal inheritance rights that were protected from gov-
ernment confiscation. 34 However, Zschernig remains the sole case invalidating
a state law on foreign affairs power grounds and its boundaries remain un-
clear.35 If interpreted at a low level of generality, Zschernig may hold that state
laws cannot entail ongoing "inquiries into the governments that obtain in par-
ticular foreign nations" or the credibility of the representations of other na-
tion's agents. 36 Alternately, it may proscribe state laws that "make unavoidable
judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our
own. 37 The MBL would then meet the Zschernig test, for it does not require
that Massachusetts or the courts conduct a case by case analysis of the Bur-
mese government's policies, instead imposing a blanket ban on state purchas-
ing linked to Burma.
When considering the case law underpinning Zschernig, however, a higher
level of generality that invalidates the MBL seems more appropriate. Though
prior cases never invalidated state laws as violations of the federal foreign af-
fairs power per se, many hinted at such a power. Chy Lung v. Freeman,3 8 in
striking down a California statute authorizing state officials to require bonds
from "undesirable," predominantly Chinese, immigrants, warned against state
policies that can "embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations."39 And
United States v. Pink40 maintained the "power over external affairs is not
shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."
41
Such cases seem less concerned with the minuteness of inquiry into foreign re-
gimes or judicial judgement upon them, than with the impact of state laws on
federal foreign affairs policy. Read in this broader manner, Zschernig may hold
34. See generally id.
35. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 163-65
(1996).
36. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434; see generally Comment, Foreign Affairs Power - The Massa-
chusetts Burma Law Is Found to Encroach on the Federal Government's Exclusive Constitutional
Authority to Regulate Foreign Affairs, 112 HARV. L. REV. 2013 (1999) (arguing Zschernig should be
interpreted at a high level of generality to better protect the federal government's exclusive authority to
regulate foreign affairs).
37. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440.
38. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
39. Id. at 280.
40. 315 U.S. 203 (1942)
41. Id. at 233 (reversing state law holding regarding nationalizations that violated federal agree-
ment with U.S.S.R.); see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (holding foreign relations must be en-
tirely free from state interference); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317
(1936) (upholding a federal statute banning arms sales to countries at war in the Chaco and finding that
"[tihe Framers' Convention... exerted its powers upon the irrefutable postulate that though the states
were several their people in respect to foreign affairs were one"); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.,
324, 331 (1937) ("[Tlhe external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state
laws or policies."); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 285 (James Madison) (M. Walter Dunne ed., 1901) ("If
we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations").
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that state policies cannot create "great potential for ... embarrassment of
United States foreign policy," have "more than ... incidental or indirect ef-
fect[s] on foreign countries," or arise from "foreign policy attitudes ... [as] the
real desiderata. 4 2 Given the MBL's intent to influence Burma43 and the Dis-
trict Court and First Circuit's findings that it has more than an indirect effect
on Burma, the law fails to meet a stronger Zschernig test.44
II. THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION EXTENDED
Nonetheless, compelling doctrinal and policy considerations suggest the
MBL should not fall within traditional foreign commerce and foreign affairs
analyses, but rather within a market participant exception. The Court's juris-
prudence places no obstacles before such an extension. Though Reeves v.
Stake45 suggested that "Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous
when restraint upon foreign commerce is alleged,"46 the Court can achieve
heightened scrutiny through stricter Commerce Clause tests or, as will be sug-
gested, a modified preemption standard. Similarly, the fact that the Court de-
clined to extend the market participant exception to the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause does not undercut the merits of its extension in this context.
Rather, United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County
v. Mayor and Council of Camden47 implicitly supports such an extension.
48
Like the domestic Commerce Clause, the foreign commerce and foreign affairs
powers "act as ... implied restraint[s] upon state regulatory powers," while the
Privileges and Immunities Clause grants a "protected privilege ... [that] im-
poses a direct restraint on state action .... Indeed, judicial caution and con-
sistency counsel extension of the market participant exception to state laws im-
plicating foreign affairs on at least three grounds.
First, to deny the market participant exception in this context would entail
the sweeping rejection of existing state and local laws, some of which have
been upheld, and jeopardize other laws previously found valid under domestic
Commerce Clause analysis. Currently states and municipalities enforce at least
42. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435-36.
43. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 1998) ("[The]
Commonwealth concedes that the statute was enacted solely to sanction Myanmar for human rights
violations and to change Myanmar's domestic policies.")
44. See id. at 291 ("The Massachusetts Burma Law has more than an 'indirect or incidental effect
in foreign countries,' and a 'great potential for disruption or embarrassment."'); Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 55 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[The Massachusetts Burma Law has more than an
"incidental or indirect effect').
45. 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980)
46. Id. at 437.
47. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
48. See generally id. (invalidating under the Privileges and Immunities Clause a municipal ordi-
nance requiring that 40 % of employees of contractors working on city construction projects to Camden
residents).
49. Id at 220.
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thirty-one selective purchasing and divestment laws aimed at human rights
abuses abroad, and numerous "Buy American" statutes that affect foreign
commerce as well. 50 With the exception of Natsios, lower courts have quite
consistently approved such laws, while invalidating statutes in which states or
municipalities utilize their regulatory or taxation powers to the same end,
rather than their market power. 5' The Court should pause before establishing
such a disruptive precedent. Furthermore, disallowing the market participant
exception for foreign commerce would create confusion and awkward contra-
dictions with domestic Commerce Clause analysis. For instance, Reeves vali-
dated South Dakota's decision to confine sales from a state-owned cement
plant to state residents during a cement shortage.52 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corporation53 authorized additional documentation requirements for firms lo-
cated outside of Maryland, who sought to receive state bounties for converting
junk cars into scrap.54 Would the Court's refusal to extend the market partici-
pant exception imply that South Dakota and Maryland may continue such dis-
crimination against out-of-state domestic firms, but must provide foreign and
instate firms with identical terms of trade?
Second, extending the market participant exception would lend consistency
50. See Selinger, supra note 7, at B8.
51. For statutes upheld in which municipalities use their investment or purchasing power, see Tro-
jan Tech., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 909-14 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding a Pennsylvania statute
requiring U.S.-made steel in state public works projects), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991); Bd. of
Trustees v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093
(1990) (upholding Baltimore's divestment of pension-fund investments from South Africa); K.S.B.
Technical Sales Corp. v. New Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774, 788 (N.J. 1977) (up-
holding a New Jersey "Buy American" statute); and North American Salt Co. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp.,
701 N.E.2d 454, 462-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (upholding an Ohio "Buy American" statute). For similar
statutes invalidated that because they use regulatory or taxation powers see Tayyari v. New Mexico
State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1376 (D.N.M. 1980) (invalidating a motion passed by the Regents of the
State University that denied Iranian students continued enrollment until the return of American hostages
as violating equal protection, conflicting with federal immigration policy, and frustrating federal foreign
policy during an international conflict); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d
300, 307 (11. 1986) (invalidating a sales tax exemption applied to coins and currency from all countries
except South Africa and "hold[ing] only that disapproval of the political and social policies of a foreign
nation does not provide a valid basis for a tax classification by this State"); New York Times Co. v. City
of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 968-69 (N.Y. 1977) (finding that New York
could not apply local anti-discrimination laws to prohibit the New York Times from carrying advertise-
ments for employment opportunities in South Africa). See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-21, 469 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that while state laws banning private individu-
als and companies from business with South Africa would be invalid under Zschernig, "under the Su-
preme Court's market participant exception to the commerce clause, a state would be free to pass ...
rules requiring that purchases of goods and services by and for the state government be made only from
companies that have divested themselves of South African commercial involvement") (footnote omit-
ted); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 590, 595 (invali-
dating a Maine statute that granted more limited tax benefits to non-profit organizations largely serving
non-residents and finding a constitutionally significant difference between taxation and subsidies or
market participation). But see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221,
229 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1969) (invalidating the California Buy American Act).
52. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 430, 446-47.
53. 426 U.S 794
54. See id. at 800-01, 814.
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to the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. To date the Court has not es-
tablished a general applicability test.55 Yet every Tenth Amendment Com-
merce Clause case since Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity
56 supports the proposition that the federal government may not impose
domestic Commerce Clause restrictions that burden states more heavily than
private parties.57 The general applicability principle gains force from the
deeper constitutional justifications of federalism: it provides a check to federal
limitations on state action, ensuring that states may continue to "serve as labo-
ratories for social and economic experiment" and as political communities ca-
pable of expressing citizens' shared values.58
The market participant exception is a natural outgrowth of the general ap-
plicability principle, for exercising the right to choose with whom to contract is
a natural and protected method of experimenting and expressing shared val-
ues. 59 By invalidating the MBL, the Court would contradict the general appli-
cability principle and vastly circumscribe state freedom to contract relative to
private parties whose procurement policies may have a much greater effect on
foreign nations. For instance, each of the U.S. Fortune 500 firms controls an-
nual revenues greater than Massachusetts' procurement budget, and 71 com-
mand revenues larger than Massachusetts' total budget, much of which sup-
ports non-commercial activities. 60 These firms exercise their influence-Pepsi,
Levi-Strauss, and Macy's recently withdrew operations or prohibited new in-
55. See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2000) ("[W]e need not address the question whether
general applicability is a constitutional requirement for federal regulation of the States, because the
[Driver's Privacy Protection Act] is generally applicable.").
56. 469 U.S. 528, 554-56 (1985).
57. See id. (upholding the Driver's Privacy Protection Act as generally applicable); South Carolina
v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 510 (1998) (validating a federal tax on municipal bonds that already applied in
stronger form to privately-issued bonds); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 903 (1997) (striking
down a statute restricting the issuance of handguns that conscripted state officials for its enforcement
while imposing lighter burdens on private issuers of handguns); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 176-177 (1992) (striking down the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Pol-
icy Amendments Act that forced states alone either to take title to nuclear waste or regulate it according
to federal standards); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554-56 (authorizing the equal application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to public mass-transit authorities and private parties).
58. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546 ("States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experi-
ment if they must pay an added price when they ... [take] up functions that [an] earlier day ... left in
private hands.").
59. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940) ("[Like] private individuals and
businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine
those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed pur-
chases."); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (supporting "the long recognized
right of [a] trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal").
60. See FORTUNE, 1999 FORTUNE 500 (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http://www.fortune.com/fortune/
fortune500/index.html>. The 1999 Massachusetts budget, including non-tax income, was $19.5 billion,
see COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET, CH. 194 OF THE ACTS OF
1998 (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http://www.state.ma.us/legis/senate/99budget/contents.htn>, while its pro-
curement budget is over $2 billion, see National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st
Cir. 1999).
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vestment in Burma, independent of selective purchasing laws like the MBL, 61
and corporate codes of conduct incorporating human rights concerns are prolif-
erating. 62 Similarly individual consumers are free to purchase only from com-
panies they deem socially responsible, and have done so historically: Massa-
chusetts citizens boycotted tea from the morally unattractive East India
Company in the 18th century and slave-made goods in the mid-19th century.
63
Granted the foreign commerce and affairs powers contemplate greater federal
authority than the domestic Commerce Clause and consequently the general
applicability principle should not be irrefutable. Foreign nations, especially
those unaccustomed to federalism, will more likely ascribe state action impli-
cating foreign affairs to the United States than they would action by U.S.
firms.64 But at the least it should be congressional preemption, not judicial pre-
scription, that determines whether in this context the need for unitary foreign
policy outweighs the merits of general applicability.
Finally, extending the market participant exception to foreign affairs and
commerce actually provides federal actors with a wider range of foreign policy
tools. In deciding whether to extend the exception, the Court will determine the
default relationship between state and federal action in foreign affairs. Both de-
faults entail costs. Under the first--denying the market participant exception-
all state procurement action implicating foreign affairs is presumptively inva-
lid, but Congress may affirmatively authorize it under Article 1, § 10.65 Given
impediments to enacting legislation, Congress will likely fail in some instances
to authorize state action it supports in this arrangement. Furthermore, forcing a
congressional majority to voice support openly will actually constrain Con-
61. See OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, BuRMA PROJECT, BuRMA BACKGROUNDER: FOREIGN
INvEsTMENT (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http://www.soros.org/burma/CRISIS/index.htm>.
62. A recent Department of Labor report observes "codes of conduct have become increasingly
common in recent years," and finds that 36 of 42 apparel manufacturers surveyed have some form of
policy specifically prohibiting the use of child labor in overseas production facilities, often in conjunc-
tion with prohibitions against forced labor, discrimination and forced overtime, and guarantees for
workplace safety, minimum wages, the right to collectively bargain. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE APPAREL INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDUCT: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CHILD LABOR PROBLEM? §§ I.D, II.D.3, II.E.2 (1996),
<http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/media/reports/ iclp/apparel/main.htm>; see also John Christopher
Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 463, 474-89 (2000) (summarizing corporate codes of conduct including the Sullivan Principles and
the MacBride Principles); Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing International La-
bor Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 665 (1995)
("Codes of conduct for international business operations are proliferating as investors, companies and
governments confront demands to respect human and labor rights claims.").
63. Akhil Reed Amar, A State's Right, a Government's Wrong, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2000, at B 1.
64. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 228 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("The states are un-
known to foreign nations").
65. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power...."). For example Massachu-
setts currently maintains twenty-three "sister state" and other bilateral agreements with sub-national
foreign governments and trade promotion organizations. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 50.
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gressional action. 66 For example, in the case of Burma, Congress's optimal
policy may be to enact weaker federal sanctions on Burma in the interest of
building multilateral support with ASEAN countries supporting "constructive
engagement," while supplementing federal sanctions with stronger state and
local selective purchasing laws.67 If Congress must explicitly authorize statutes
like the MBL, this "good cop, bad cop" strategy is eliminated, for Congress
can no longer claim lack of responsibility for the sub-national selective pur-
chasing statutes they tacitly support.
The converse default presents more negotiable constraints upon foreign
policy. Under the market participant exception, state procurement action is
valid unless Congress indicates some intent to preempt. Again, transaction
costs in legislating imply that some state policies will persist which, in the in-
terest of a unitary voice in foreign affairs, Congress would prefer removed.
Given the presumed importance of the foreign policy concern, however, such
transaction costs should be weaker than under the first default.68 Under a weak
preemption standard, Congress would also need explicitly to preempt selective
purchasing laws. Doing so on a case-by-case basis might signal softness on a
given foreign policy concern. And failure to preempt expressly might hinder
multilateral deal-making if other countries expected the U.S. to control its sub-
national units, became frustrated with judicial vacillation in determining im-
plied preemption, or misconstrued such vacillation as executive duplicity.
Nonetheless, Congress likely has greater expertise than the courts to determine
the effect on multilateral deal-making and may enact a blanket preemption if it
sees fit. Moreover, a more sensitive preemption standard coupled with a market
participant exception would eliminate most of these concerns, while preserving
the "good cop, bad cop" strategy as a federal policy option.
66. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) (discussing how minoritarian default rules can inhibit strate-
gic behavior that benefits majorities by forcing them to disclose information).
67. For implicit support of this interpretation of congressional intent, see Brief of Members of
Congress, Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and For Reversal at * 1, Natsios v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council (No. 99-474) (brief of 78 senators and representatives expressing concern "that the court of ap-
peals has usurped the authority of Congress to determine whether to preempt state law based upon for-
eign commerce or foreign affairs concerns"). But see Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in
Support of Respondent and for Affirmance at *i, Natsios (No. 99-474) (brief of 20 senators and repre-
sentatives arguing "the Court should declare a 'per se' rule invalidating direct involvement by State and
local governments in making foreign policy through imposing . . . sanctions."); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Aftirmance at *3, Natsios (No. 99-474) (asserting that the MBL,
"while consistent with United States foreign policy in its ultimate end, seeks to achieve that end by
means that diverge from those chosen by the President and Congress").
68. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Separation of Powers in Foreign Affairs: The New Formalism in United
States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1421 (1999) (arguing that political branches
are more likely to intervene when courts underprotect by not preempting state law "because political
branch responsiveness is at its height when a gap in federal law harms U.S. foreign relations interests,"
and less likely to intervene when courts overprotect by preempting state law "because judicial errors of
this type do not typically have adverse effects on U.S. foreign relations").
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III. APPLYING THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION
If the market participation exception were extended to the foreign com-
merce and foreign affairs power, the MBL would qualify as market participa-
tion, contrary to the First Circuit's finding.69 In Reeves7 ° and Hughes,7t the
Court distinguished market participation, which includes state purchases, from
state regulation that may involve tax policy or prohibitions on the flow of se-
lected articles of commerce. The MBL uses state purchases, not taxation or
regulation, to achieve its policy goals. Similarly, under White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers and its progeny, states must confine selec-
tive purchasing laws to a "discrete, identifiable class of economic activity"
rather than effectively regulating by encompassing substantially downstream
and upstream effects. 72 The MBL remains market participation under this line
of cases by declining to encompass downstream or upstream transactions. It
does not proscribe state purchasing from firms that have done business with
Burma in the past, nor does contracting with Massachusetts prevent a firm
from doing business with Burma in the future. Though the restrictions on pur-
chases from firms with sub-contractors in Burma may hint of an "economic
ripple," such hints are likely permissible given White's holding that market
participant exception "does not require the [state] to stop at formal privity of
contract. '73 Further, under the market participant exception the MBL's impact
on Burma is immaterial, for the exception operates at the threshold, exempting
state action from Commerce Clause restraints when the state operates as a mar-
ket participant, regardless of its impact.74
69. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 63 (1st Cir.) (1999) ("[lI]n enacting
the Massachusetts Burma Law the Commonwealth has crossed over the line from market participant to
market regulator.").
70. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) ("[T]he Commerce Clause responds principally to state
taxes and regulatory measures.... There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of
the States themselves to operate freely in the free market.") (citations omitted).
71. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806-08 (1976) (validating a statute on the
grounds that Maryland did not seek to prohibit or regulate the flow of hulks but rather entered the mar-
ket as a purchaser, restricting trade to its own citizens or businesses within the state).
72. See White v. Mass. Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 211, n.7 (1983) (up-
holding an executive order that at least half of employees on city-funded construction projects be Boston
residents); see also Wisconsin Dep't of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S.
282, 283 (1986) (striking down on preemption grounds a Wisconsin law barring the state from doing
business with repeat violators of the National Labor Relations Act); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke 467 U.S. 82, 96-98 (1984) (holding that Alaska cannot require that timber from state lands be
processed within the state before being exported because "the seller usually has no say over ... how the
product is to be used after sale" and "[this] restriction on private economic activity takes place after the
completion of the parties' direct commercial obligations, rather than during the course of an ongoing
commercial relationship"); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978) (invalidating an Alaska statute
requiring an employment preference for Alaskan residents for all work connected with oil and gas leases
to which the State was a party, holding it forced "all businesses that benefit in some way from the eco-
nomic ripple effect" to comply).
73. White, 460 U.S. at 211, n.7.
74. See id. at 210 ("If the city is a market participant the Commerce Clause establishes no barrier.
... Impact on out-of-state residents figures in the equation only after it is decided that the city is regu-
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The MBL's purpose of promoting human rights in Burma also should not
invalidate it under the market participant exception. The First Circuit suggests
that the exception "does not permit Massachusetts to pursue goals that are not
designed to favor its citizens or to secure local benefits." 75 But such a limited
interpretation contradicts the Court's holding in Hughes that environmental
conservation is a valid object of selective purchasing laws, and that "an 'inde-
pendent justification' [is] unnecessary to sustain [a] State's program. 76
Moreover, to confine the market participant exception to selfish goals, while
invalidating selfless aims, would be tantamount to judicial legislation in eco-
nomic policy. It implies that maximizing economic wealth regardless of exter-
nalities, is the only valid governmental policy, while maximizing social value
is not. The MBL, for instance, can be seen as a selfless choice of Massachu-
setts citizens to pay more in taxes in order to ensure that state purchases made
with their funds incorporate externalities like forced labor that may render
some firms able to offer lower bids.77
Instead, the First Circuit's stronger argument is that "Massachusetts's ac-
tion here is akin to prohibiting purchases from companies that do business in
states that have policies with which Massachusetts disagrees. This would
plainly be unconstitutional under the domestic Commerce Clause."78 Their
analogy invokes fears that permitting non-self-interested state purposes would
grant states free rein to use the market participant exception to promote any
policy whatsoever. Yet the exception's limitation to discrete, identifiable
classes of economic activity, and the option of preemption, both mitigate such
wide-ranging state authority. Furthermore, human rights violations may prop-
erly fall into a different analytic category from "policies." Perhaps the First
Circuit would not be so sanguine regarding the "plain" unconstitutionality of a
hypothetical 19th Century statute prohibiting state purchases from companies
that employed slave labor. In Burma's case, substantial evidence exists that the
government does just that, engaging in summary executions, rape, torture,
forced relocations, forced labor, and widespread repression of democratic op-
lating the market rather than participating in it.").
75. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 64 (1st Cir. 1999).
76. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 809 (holding that "Maryland entered the market for the purpose, agreed by
all to be commendable as well as legitimate, of protecting the State's environment" but that "the Com-
merce Clause was [not] intended to require independent justification" for such state market participa-
tion).
77. For instance, commentators have condemned Unocal for profiting from the Burmese govern-
ment's forced labor practices and such charges are now being litigated. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.
Supp. 880, 885, 892, 898 (1997) (finding jurisdiction and denying a motion to dismiss by Unocal against
charges that it "continue[s] to be aware of and benefit from the use of forced labor to support the Yadana
gas pipeline project" and participated in slave trading); Anderson, supra note 62, at 463 ("The Burmese
military government has forced entire villages to work on the railroad [for Unocal's pipeline] without
pay while under armed guard by Burmese troops .....
78. Natsios, 181 F.3dat65.
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position including 1991 Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. 79 These practices
violate the Forced Labour Convention of 1930, which Burma ratified in 1955
and from which it unilaterally withdrew last June80 and jus cogens norms
against summary execution, torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment.
81
The Court may prefer to avoid necessary determinations on nations' compli-
ance with human rights law in its market participant jurisprudence. But at the
very least the goal of promoting human rights is "commendable," and therefore
under Reeves the MBL's purpose provides greater, not less, reason for applying
the market participant exception.
82
IV. PREEMPTION STANDARDS MODIFIED
Given the long-standing recognition of heightened federal authority in for-
eign affairs, however, the Court should not extend an unaltered market partici-
pant doctrine to the international context. A more sensitive preemption stan-
dard ensures that Congress may "make us, as far as regarded our foreign
policy, one people, and one nation."
83
In areas of traditional state concern such as government procurement, the
preemption standard is strict: absent "clear and manifest" congressional pre-
emption, 84 the Court will infer preemption only if a state law does "major dam-
age to clear and substantial federal interests." 85 In the foreign affairs context,
79. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: BURMA (2000), (visited Mar.l, 2000)
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/I 999_hrpreport/burma.html>; AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, MYANMAR: 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF MILITARY REPRESSION (1998) (finding that since
seizing power the Burmese government has "killed, tortured, raped, imprisoned and forcibly relocated
hundreds of thousands of Burmese people"); Forced Labour Persists in Myanmar: ILO Applies Ex-
traordinary Constitutional Procedures, ILO NEWS, (International Labour Organization, Geneva), Mar.
29, 2000 (reporting that the Burmese government continues to engage in forced labor, including forced
sex for the military, and that failure to comply results in arrest and torture).
80. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, CONVENTION NO. C29 WAS RATIFIED BY 152
COUNTRIES (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/ratifce.pl?C29>; DEP'T OF STATE,
supra note 79. As a result of these forced labor practices, a 1998 International Labour Organization
Commission of Inquiry held the Burmese government was "guilty of an international crime that is also,
if committed in a widespread or systematic manner, a crime against humanity," INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANIZATION, ILO/98/32 (Press Release), REPORT OF ILO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
REVEALS WIDESPREAD AND SYSTEMATIC USE OF FORCED LABOUR IN MYANMAR (BURMA), Oct. 20,
1998. (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/1998/32.htm>. This year
the ILO Governing Board invoked Article 33 for the first time in its 80-year history to secure compli-
ance with the Commission's recommendations. See Forced Labour Persists in Myanmar, supra note 79.
81. See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN
U.S. COURTS 57 n.42 (1996).
82. See Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980) (dismissing petitioner's suggestion that a non-
protectionist goal is necessary to invoke the market participant exception, while holding that "if some
underlying 'commendable as well as legitimate' purpose is also required, it is certainly present here.")
83. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 575 (1840).
84. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229 (1947) (holding that if the subject mat-
ter of the law in question is an area traditionally occupied by the states, congressional intent to preempt
must be clear and manifest).
85. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625, 636 (1987) (finding state divorce statute requiring veteran to
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this standard is too demanding. Express preemption entails collective action
costs and the possibility of Congress appearing equivocal on an issue if, for ex-
ample, it enacts strongly worded sanctions coupled with provisions proscribing
state and local selective purchasing laws that target the same concern. Mean-
while, the implied preemption test of "major damage" to federal interests is so
difficult to prove that it will effectively eliminate implied preemption as an op-
tion.
Alternatively, the weak preemption standard that the First Circuit advanced
in Hines v. Davidowitz86 renders the market participant exception meaningless.
In Hines the Court found that federal legislation preempted a Pennsylvania
Alien Registration Act, for "where the federal government, in the exercise of
its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation
... states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or inter-
fere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or aux-
iliary regulations." 87 Where Congress has acted, such a standard is simply an
alternate expression of Zschernig's foreign affairs power, which this Case Note
suggests should permit a market participant exception.88
Instead, the Court should apply the traditional preemption analysis to state
market participation policies that affect foreign commerce or foreign affairs.
The Court summarized the classic standard as follows:
Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress's intent to supercede state law alto-
gether may be found from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room [for the states] to supplement
it.... Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific
area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal, law.
Such a conflict arises when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility,... or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
89
The MBL's status under this preemption standard is not immediately clear.
Congress did not expressly preempt state and local selective purchasing laws
when enacting the Federal Burma Law.90 Nor is compliance with both statutes
a physical impossibility. In addition, the scheme of federal regulation is not
pay child support from his federal veterans' disability benefits was not preempted because it does not
"unequivocally" conflict with federal law).
86. 312 U.S. 52(1941).
87. Id. at 66-67; see id. at 63 ("Our system of government is such that... the interest of the people
of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be
left entirely free from local interference.").
88. But see id. at 62 ("[We] expressly leav[e] open all of appellee's other contentions, including the
argument that federal power in this area, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive.").
89. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983) (holding California moratorium on nuclear plants not preempted by Atomic Energy
Act).
90. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat.
3009, 1, 166-67 (1996).
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demonstrably pervasive-though the federal sanctions prohibit private invest-
ment and restrict U.S. aid to the Burmese government, Massachusetts did in-
deed find room to supplement them through its own procurement policies. The
MBL, however, may well stand as an obstacle to the "full purposes and objec-
tives" of Congress. On the one hand, as the First Circuit asserted, the FBL
varies from the MBL by excluding contracts for goods and services, instructing
the President to develop a "multilateral strategy... to improve human rights
practices ... in Burma," and providing for the President to terminate sanctions
when human rights conditions improve.91 If such provisions are central to con-
gressional objectives the FBL could preempt. On the other hand, evidence ex-
ists that Congress did not intend to preempt. Seventy-eight representatives and
senators submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the MBL, while 20
92submitted one in opposition. In 1997 and 1998 Congress considered and de-
clined to restrict state selective purchasing laws targeting human rights
abuses.93 And the Uruguay Round Agreements Act states, "it is the intent of
Congress ... to occupy the field with respect to any cause of action or defense
under or in connection with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements [URA].
94
Given that the MBL likely violates this treaty, amici congressional representa-
tives asserted they have not preempted the MBL but rather have proscribed the
private action at hand because it is brought "in connection with" the URA.95
In cases of such confusion regarding the permissibility of obstacles to fed-
eral objectives, the Court holds that as long as the specifics of a state statute
undergird the broadly defined purpose of a federal act, the Court will not infer
91. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 76 (1st Cir. 1999).
92. See Brief of Members of Congress, Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and For Reversal at
* 1, Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council (No. 99-474); Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Con-
gress in Support of Respondent and for Affirmance at *i, Natsios (No. 99-474). Though preemption
turns on congressional intent, the Executive Branch did finally submit a brief in support of affirmance at
the Supreme Court level. See United State Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Af-
firmance at *3, Natsios (No. 99-474).
93. In 1997 a bill intended to limit federal trade sanctions did not apply to state and local legisla-
tion, even though its sponsor noted that "roughly 20 States and localities have adopted laws prohibiting
government commercial dealings with ... countries that have poor human rights records" and "some of
[these]... sanctions raise difficult questions concerning the constitutional authority to conduct U.S.
trade and foreign policy." See H.R. 2708, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1997); 143 CONG. REc. E. 2080 (Oct.
23, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hamilton). In 1998, the House of Representatives also debated the consti-
tutionality and wisdom of state and local actions affecting foreign policy without acting to preempt such
laws. See 144 CONG. REc. H7277-H7285 (Aug. 5, 1998).
94. Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, §102(c)(2), 108 Stat. 4809, 19
U.S.C.S §3512(c)(2) (1994).
95. See Brief of Members of Congress, Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and For Reversal at
*10, Natsios (No. 99-474). Amici also argue the action is barred under the Statement of Administrative
action for the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (SAA), 19 U.S.C. § 351 1(a), "which constitutes the
'authoritative expression by the United States concerning the interpretation and application of the
[URAA] in any judicial proceeding,' 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d), [and] states unambiguously that WTO rules
may not be used 'directly or indirectly' in a private action, including an action based on 'Congress's
Commerce Clause authority,' SAA, reprinted at 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4440, at 20." Id. at * 10.
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preemption, even if the state law provides for more vigorous enforcement.
96
The MBL and the FBL both share the goal of promoting human rights in
Burma, even if the FBL in some respects covers a narrower range of business
activity and a more finite time period. In addition, in the presence of such am-
biguity congressional intent is the "ultimate touchstone, 97 and there is a pre-
sumption against preemption.98 Significant evidence from congressional action
and inaction suggests that Congress did not intend to preempt the MBL. In
contrast, the only evidence of preemption lies in differences between the spe-
cifics of each statute. Consequently, as the district court found, the plaintiff
failed to carry the burden of proof of intent to preempt, and the MBL should
stand.99
V. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Despite its validity under a market participant exception and traditional
preemption analysis, the life of the MBL will nonetheless likely be short. In
1997 the E.U. and Japan lodged complaints with the WTO, asserting that the
MBL violates the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement to which the
United States and Massachusetts are both signatories. 1°° The dispute went as
far as a WTO dispute panel but was suspended when the District Court invali-
dated the MBL in November 1998.101 Assuming the dispute panel finds the
MBL is a violation, Massachusetts must rescind the law or the United States
will face penalties. °2 The case therefore implicitly raises questions regarding
the role of international law in U.S. courts and the authority of Congress to
deny private causes of action under treaties to which the United States is a
party. Nonetheless such fundamental questions should be deferred. Deciding
Natsios on its merits in U.S. law both abides by congressional intent to pre-
serve state statutes like the MBL that may violate the WTO, and through the
eventual imposition of penalties or diplomatic embarrassment pressures Con-
gress to cease placing obstacles to the implementation of international treaties
96. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 78 (upholding an Indiana law severely limiting
hostile corporate takeovers relative to federal law as not frustrating the congressional purpose to strike a
careful balance between the interests of offerors and target companies even though "very few tender
offers could run the gauntlet that Indiana has set up").
97. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S.
282, 290 (1986) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985)); Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
98. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1983) (holding that state-authorized
award of punitive damages arising out of the escape of plutonium from a federally licensed nuclear fa-
cility was not preempted by Atomic Energy Act and that "it is Kerr-McGee's burden to show that Con-
gress intended to preclude such awards").
99. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 292 (D. Mass. 1998).
100. See EU/US: Supreme Court To Examine Massachusetts Burma Law, EUR. REP., Dec. 4, 1999.
101. See Supreme Court Review of "Burma Law" Will Decide Local Sanction Power, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 30, 1999.
102. See Pedersen, supra note 1, at A19.
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in U.S. law. In such a scenario, although the WTO protestors may lose the bat-
tle for the MBL, they could win the war as human rights treaties gain justi-
ciability in U.S. courts.
